Energy is ever more becoming the piston driving Latin America to the contemporary world stage.

This reality arrives in lieu of major Chinese and Russian investments in Venezuela’s petroleum belt, Mexico’s intense debate over how to diversify foreign investment in its state-run energy powerhouse, and Brazil’s ever-expanding oil coffers that continue to propel its economy upward in the face of a global economic recession.

These three states lead energy production in Latin America and will increasingly become a lifeline for the world’s swelling consumer demand, and key to its sustainable growth. Petroleum and natural gas have for a time been assets sought heavily by the US and Europe, but now draw clientele from the surging populace of China, India, and wider Eurasia.

Amid this equation, guaranteed global supplies remain variable, tending to degrade in both refining ease and reserve accessibility. This, coupled with security concerns in the Middle East, marks a unique opportunity for the region to fund much needed domestic reform and present viable energy initiatives to the international community, beyond the distant third tier.

A fundamental challenge in scaling these energy companies to meet such global demand will be the state’s ability to balance its investment and revenue model. All three of these Latin American countries highlighted here have state-run energy sectors, though all are not created equal. For a more informative look, see the comparative breakdown below:

Country	México	Brazil	Venezuela
Founded	1938	1953	1975
Petro Profile	Heavy Crude (2/3, Maya), Light Crude (1/3, Isthmus & Olmeca)	Predominantly Heavy Crude (Marlim), although newly discovered, subsalt fields are of Light grade and Sweet substance	Almost entirely Extra-Heavy Crude, of Sour substance (high sulfur)
Proven Reserve Capacity	10-13.68 billion	12.35 billion	99 billion
Largest Reserve	Cantarell	Sugar Loaf	Orinoco Belt
Onshore / Offshore %	20/80	40/60	Predominately onshore reserves, spread across 4 principal fields. Shallow water reserves in the Maracaibo Basin
Production Output	2.8 million bbl/d	2.72 million bbl/d	1.5 million bbl/d
Refining Capabilities	1.5 million bbl/d (6 refineries)	2.223 million bbl/d (16 refineries)	1.28 million bbl/d (Domestic & foreign refineries- Citgo USA)
Annual Revenue	US $98 Billion (2008)	US $118.3 billion (2008)	US $120 billion (2008), est. US $50 billion  (2009)
Foreign Investors	Sparse due to tight regulation by state apparatus, although the Calderón adminstration has opened doors for foreign investment on the deep sea exploration front	Private sector energy (Shell, Cheveron), BP (biofuels), China	Previous investors included major intl. petroleum giants, but after state reappropriation, Russia, Iran, China, & Brazil have agreed to looser terms under the Bolivarian regime
Principal Export Recipient(s)	United States	Largely utilized for growing domestic consumption, biofuels (ethanol) make up bulk of energy export	United States & Europe, China fastest growing consumer

SOURCES: US Energy Information Administration, Oil & Gas Journal, Business Week, CIA World Factbook

These numbers are enlightening in the sense that they present a snapshot of current carrying capacity and orientation of each state’s petroleum sector. However, a deeper study of energy futures can prove to be a bit speculative.

In the case of México, PEMEX has long been the case study on state investment of natural resource and economic autonomy. It relies heavily on taxes from its rich output to fund an array of federal initiatives and deliver energy to the Mexican consumer at a subsidized price. But, wrought with declining output on its principal oil field, Cantarell, the company has a need to exploit deeper off-shore deposits that require sophisticated equipment and a niche expertise– tasks honed upon by transnational powerhouses such as ExxonMobil, BP, and other state companies such as PETROBRAS. Due to this shifting source dynamic, the Calderón administration has worked diligently to promote external investment. This however remains a major political hot button due to historic precedent, as the industry’s sovereignty is seen as a sacred right to the Mexican populace. PEMEX has more than the necessary resources to carry onward, but significant institutional reform will remain fundamental.

PETROBRAS has gained measurable authority in the international energy sector both for the diversification of its investments, and the expertise of its workforce. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has worked diligently to build a state model that profit shares with private enterprise, while promoting a solid domestic refining infrastructure. Recent offshore discoveries in sub-salt reserves via the Tupi fields continue to grow the Brazilian lot, while Brazilian officials are aiming to funnel revenue to direct state initiatives and maintain energy independence. For the time being, Brazil appears to be playing its cards right to promote sizable production in means to maximize internal growth. It will be interesting to see when it goes net positive in its production, to which countries it will direct its resources.

Turning to the more volatile petroleum sector, Venezuela has seen its share of production ebbs and waves in the past decade. President Hugo Chávez has too tapped into the ‘petro vein’ to fund large swaths of state initiatives, however often with a playbook at odds with much of its professional workforce. Lack of international investment (due to restrictive reappropriation efforts) and flight of expertise have reduced export capacity and bogged down exploratory projects in the Llanos sector and Orinoco Basin. The state energy company, PDVSA, however sits upon perhaps the world’s largest crude reserves in the Orinoco Belt, rivaling fields in Saudi Arabia. Due to its heavy tar-like viscosity though, special refining capabilities are needed to extract petroleum from sand and sludge– a role the United States currently fulfills. This is where large investment by China and Russia will float PDVSA initiatives in the near future despite waste from within. This, while the Venezuelan state maintains institutional direction and pads its GDP.

Overall, with the exception of Brazilian offshore reserves, it appears that most new petroleum pools are of heavier grade crude. This will require a more expensive refining process and specialized facilities, promoting favorable conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI) and transnational partnerships.

The manner in which each of these companies respond to its new role in the world energy sector will be developments watched closely by all, but seems to present favorable prospects to a long-forgotten region.

Felipe Ariza, Presidencia – SP

Not surprisingly, the bilateral defense agreement to extend terms of US presence in Colombia has ruffled the feathers of a few Latin American leaders at the Unasur conference in the mountain oasis of Bariloche, Argentina this week.

In reality, most everyone who follows this agreement, and the two countries’ historic defense cooperation, realizes this is merely a formalization of affairs. It’s no secret the US had a definitive role assisting Colombian officials in the hostage dupe against the FARC (Operation Jaque) last year, nor that they continue to provide intelligence, logistics, and training to its officials in means to undermine insurgent opposition and disrupt narco factions.

However, by no means have we seen a surge of in US troop/contractor levels, ceding of Colombian sovereignty, nor direct engagement that even remotely presents a bellicose shift toward neighboring American states. Any quips of this nature are fabrications of pure ‘Pixar’ scale. Now, whether or not this extended agreement is truly an effective defense measure for either country, alongside Plan Colombia, is another debate entirely.

Nonetheless, verbal crossfire ensued between the ALBA-aligned nations and president Álvaro Uribe of Colombia surrounding the sealed agreement. While Uribe outlined the case of mutual responsibility in such partnership and preached its concrete results that extend beyond verbal apathy, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa emphasized the ulterior motives of US force projection and the destabilizing nature of such a move.

This is rather ironic considering that it was Correa’s mandate to scrub the lower-profile U.S. base in Manta that spurred this broadened initiative. And, in literal terms of regional destabilization, Chávez has a wrap sheet of saber rattling, ‘covert’ support for illicit factions, and arms acquisition from Russia and elsewhere that clearly trump any augmentative facet of this development.

Perhaps the most amusing exchange in this reunion came from Peruvian president Alan García, in lieu of Chávez’s insinuation that the US was preparing to invade Venezuela for its vast energy resources:

“Man, why are they going to dominate the petroleum if you already sell it all to the United States?” Mr. García said. The remark drew laughter, though not from Mr. Chávez.”

For a solid video recap of the summit, check out BBC Mundo (in Spanish), or its article review (in English).

Also, for more on the Chávez front, check out the polarizing profile by former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, Otto Reich, at ForeignPolicy.com.

Photo by Andres via Flickr

No tanks grind along the washed-out streets of Caracas, nor have battalions stormed breakaway sectors of Venezuela this Monday. No revolutions were to be televised. Rest assured Ms. O’Grady, the Andean state lives to see another day.

Record numbers of Venezuelans hit the streets yesterday, enduring long lines to partake in the country’s regional and municipal elections.

After months of lofty expectations for a political showdown between Chavistas and opposition to the current regime, results dictated in the early hours this morning permit neither side to boast of fervent victory.

Charged for many months by an aura of executive scale, the vote would gauge popular sentiment for President Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian mandate and the fate of candidates who positioned themselves to such. Given his widespread grip upon the allied majority of Venezuela’s 22 states, it would test support for his ‘por ahora‘ stance, an onward pursuit toward expanding his grandiose socialist agenda.

Upon the announced results from the national election board (CNE), Chávez publicly declared:

We have a map almost completely dressed in of red, just a bit of red [...] It’s a great victory for our people, for the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela). The road toward the construction of socialism has ratified itself– the new historic project of Venezuela; and now, we will move to deepen and extend it.

Although pro-Chávez candidates claimed victory in major swaths of the country, the most populous sectors with significant political sway, including the greater mayor of the nation’s capital Caracas, ceded to opposition. These decisive blows included wins in oil-heavy Zulia, north central Miranda, Tachira, and the industrial powerhouse, Carabobo. It appears grassroot frustrations with public security, inflation, high cost of food commodities, and lack of alternative chopped a leg from under the president on his country’s throne.

Chávez, however, contines to hold solid river cards at the governing table, brandishing broad insitutional control and consolidating party loyalists at nearly every level. Yet, his absolute goal of rehashing the failed 2007 constitutional referendum (allowing among other items, unlimited reelection) continues to sink, further washed over by the political riptide of yesterday’s ballot draw.

Looks as though PBS Frontline will offer us a delectable Thanksgiving-week special this upcoming November 25. Before Americans’ traditional overeating, and the turkey’s dose of L-tryptophan set in, the documentary series aims to “[chronicle] Hugo Chavez’s ascent to power and his efforts to use the powers of the presidency to stay there.”

Considering this documentary will have a timely release amid upcoming Venezuelan regional elections (Nov. 23), it shall be intriguing to see what analytical conclusions the film draws in the wake of this critical political juncture for Venezuela. Although Chavez has been able to eliminate a swath of his key rivals, this race threatens his projection in pivotal sectors of the country— a prospect that would not settle well with the ire of ‘Chavistas’.

The program written, produced, and directed by filmmaker, Ofra Bikel, will pre-release on Frontline’s web site beginning Nov. 19.

Check out a preview below, and give us your take on the film upon its release— Chavez undoubtedly will.

Venezuela is not a particularly popular topic in Washington these days. To most, the bombastic rhetoric that President Hugo Chávez throws to the airwaves on an almost weekly basis has instilled an innate ‘mute’ response from those in the American foreign policy sector. Indeed, at times the elaborate feuds of the Venezuelan regime play out more as a flailing telenovela than international diplomacy.

Behind the scenes however, political rip tides are stirring Caracas in the midst of upcoming federal and municipal elections at the year’s end. On such accord, a rising young politician, Mayor Leopoldo López of Chacao, made it a point to visit the United States this past week to convey a sense of both the elections’ significance and shine light on its already fraudulent bearing.

Featured in Monday’s Washington Post op-ed , López is among hundreds of opposition candidates that have been blacklisted by the government well before the ballots are to be cast by the greater public. Jack Diehl of the Times explains:

“Two weeks ago, Venezuela’s national electoral council, dominated by Chávez followers, moved to ban López and 371 other candidates from the Novemeber state and local elections, which are shaping up as the most important since Chávez was first elected nine years ago. This broad exclusion was based entirely on the finding of another Chávez appointee, who ruled that each of the candidates was guilty of an administrative or legal offense, though none has been judged in court.”

To this end, López spoke before a forum organized by the Inter-American Dialogue, in which he outlined the progress made in the Cachao municipality of Caracas, the growing necessities of the Venezuelan populace, and the fallacies contrived by the regime to undermine ‘alternative’ governance (Audio here).

According to López, the current regime holds a grip on a near 90 percent of the political system, making it difficult to maneuver on strategic and tactical levels before the monopoly. He himself has been a victim of three assassination attempts and a kidnapping in 2006, both events he attributes with certainty to the government for his discrepancies in policy.

In step with this rhetoric, López attributed the following paraphrase to Chávez himself earlier this year:

“We are confronting a possible war if we lose the regional elections in November [...] If we lose regions like Caracas, like Miranda, like Táchira, we will be in a state of war.”

Framing this motive, López cites clear breach of the Venezuelan Constitution in Articles 65, 42, and 289, which declare a citizen eligible to run unless convicted by a judicial body of a criminal offense, and in the latter article describes the limited role of the board itself to exercise nullifying powers. In an ironic twist, Chávez had been brought before the Supreme Court on such criminal charges after his manufactured coup in 1992. Even so, the decision had not been one strong enough to dispel him from the ballot box in 1998.

Despite the hostilities and a regime hell-bent to derail any potentially successful candidate, the mayor maintains that these elections must be seen in context of the 2007 mandate that aimed to indefinitely renew his executive role. It marked Chávez’s first rebuff since his election in 1998. From there, he argues a fundamental campaign for change must be fortified by a few pillars:

• A united, ‘alternative’ platform to bid for political office

• Subsequent need for such platforms to reach and conduct “good governance” on a regional and local level

And if López and other ‘alternative’ candidates were able to show some success at the polls in November?

Amid his discussion before the forum, the mayor underlined a handful of issues not handled adequately in the mind of the Venezuelan public :

• Public safety (He cites Caracas as the most dangerous city in the hemisphere with 70 murders per 10,000 inhabitants)

• Food shortages

• Housing

• Corruption

• On the international front, the state’s alleged relationship with the FARC and its diplomatic stance with regional players, including a “fundamental reshaping of relations between North and South America”

Although López carries many ambitions and insights, unless significant pressure is leveraged on Chávez in the coming months from fellow American states or domestic fervor, its seems unlikely he, nor the rest of the near 400 blacklisted candidates, will have the opportunity to lay their hand to the table. Nonetheless, the mayor’s visit has seemingly stirred the pot in Caracas, as the regime ponders the prospects of an microscope of the eroding democratic trends of the Venezuelan state.

Update: Upon his return to Caracas this past week, the mayor was subsequently detained at the airport for two hours and purportedly roughed up physically by unidentified officials. He described his treatment on Venezuelan television as unacceptable. His claims were later to be satirized across several programs.